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CRIMINAL LAW
United States v. Lance, 848 F.2d 1497
Defendant, a former county commissioner, was indicted and convicted on charges that he took kickbacks in connection with county
purchases in violation of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. In
light of the Supreme Court's decision in McNally v. United States, 483
U.S. 350 (1987), defendant asserts his mail fraud convictions are invalid.
The district court ruled that McNally should not be given retroactive effect and denied relief. This court differentiates between 1) split deals,
where the county is billed for items it never receives and the money obtained through fraud is split 50-50 between the suppliers and the defendant and 2) kickbacks where the county did receive materials and the
defendant received cash payments for placing orders with various vendors. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Lance failed
to establish prejudice with respect to the counts involving split deals and
affirmed the denial of relief on those counts. On the remaining counts,
they held that the mail fraud convictions are invalid because either the
indictment failed to charge a crime or the jury instructions and evidence
permitted Lance to be convicted on the basis of conduct that is not a
crime. Remanded with directions to vacate the convictions, fines, and
sentences on those counts.
United States v. Minanda-Enriquez, 842 F.2d 1211
Appellant Minanda-Enriquez was deported from the United States
to Mexico. The next year, when he returned to the United States to visit
his family, the border patrol agents allowed him to cross the border. He
was subsequently arrested and convicted of illegal entry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Appellant contends that the conviction required proof of intent to violate the law and that he would be allowed to
base his defense on the mistaken belief that he was lawfully present in
the United States.
The Tenth Circuit held that the government does not need to show
that the defendant willfully and knowingly engaged in criminal behavior,
but only that the defendant's acts were willful and knowing. Appellant
voluntarily reentered the United States. Therefore, the court affirmed
his conviction for illegal entry after deportation.
Chavez v. Kerby, 848 F.2d 1101
Petitioner Chavez, a state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Chavez had been convicted of criminal sexual penetration of a child under the age of 13. Chavez claims his right to due process was violated because testimony by the victim of another sexual
encounter with the defendant was admitted. Defendant also alleges the
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trial court refused to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense.
Affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the admission of testimony by the seven
year old victim of the prior act of sexual intercourse with defendant in
prosecution of defendant for criminal sexual penetration did not result
in fundamental unfairness that would warrant habeas corpus. Additionally, variance between the victim's testimony at trial and her testimony
before the grand jury was insufficient to require instruction on a lesser
included offense.
United States v. Jones, 841 F.2d 1022
While executing a search warrant, law enforcement officials seized
nine firearms at Jones' residence. Four of the guns had been reported
stolen and Jones was charged with receipt of firearms by a convicted
felon. The government could not establish exact dates as to when the
guns were stolen. The other five guns were used on a separate charge
against Jones for possession of firearms by a convicted felon. Jones was
convicted on both counts. On appeal, Jones .contends that the two convictions represent duplicate convictions.
The Tenth Circuit held that because the government could not establish dates or specific acts or transaction of receipt, it cannot divide
the collection of firearms into separate receipt and possession offenses.
Because the prosecution has only one conviction and one sentence, one
of the convictions must be vacated.
United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408
A narcotics defendant filed a collateral attack on his conviction, arguing that his continuing criminal enterprise conviction should be vacated. The district court denied the motion and the defendant
appealed. The court of appeals held that a felony in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (Controlled Substances Act) is a felony for purposes of establishing a continuing criminal enterprise under § 846, even though
such conspiracy is a lesser included offense under § 848.
United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 933
Appellant Barrett appeals his felony conviction of forging and uttering a treasury check of $236.88 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 495. Affirmed.
Following an adverse jury verdict and six-year jail sentence, Barrett
moved to correct his sentence on the grounds 18 U.S.C. § 510 treats
forgery of a treasury check of less than $500 as a misdemeanor, and that
this provision repealed by implication 18 U.S.C. § 510. In affirming the
conviction and sentence, the court of appeals noted that prosecutors
have long had the discretion of prosecuting under different statutes, and
that barring "positive repugnancy" between statutes, repeals by implication will not be found.
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United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421
Defendant was convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, using a communication facility in connection with the commission of a felony and unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant argues
the evidence was insufficient to support the continuing criminal enterprise charge in that it failed to show he organized, supervised or managed five or more persons. Further, he argues the court committed
reversible error by allowing the government to introduce evidence of
predicate offenses not specifically alleged in the indictment. Last, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion and abridged his right to a
fair trial by permitting the marshall to secure his legs with a chain during
the trial. Affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held that evidence supported the jury's finding
that defendant occupied the position of organizer, superviser or manager of metamphetamine drug dealers in addition to managing middlemen. Additionally, it held that an indictment is not constructively
amended when admission of uncharged acts does not create substantial
likelihood that defendant was convicted of an offense other than that
charged in indictment.
Last, the court held that securing defendant
with a leg chain was not an abuse of discretion in light of defendant's
past dangerous acts and the marshall's belief that restraints were absolutely necessary. Furthermore, visibility of these restraints were minimized in that defendant was brought into and removed from the
courtroom while jury was not present.
United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357
The United States government appeals from a district court decision dismissing the RICO counts of a racketeering indictment. Reversed and remanded.
The defendants were charged with violating Colorado's commercial bribery statue for conspiring with a Mr. Lee, of the Public Service
Company of Colorado, in racketeering activity. Mr. Lee and the defendants agreed that Mr. Lee would accept money in exchange for awarding
public service contracts to the defendant's supply business. Additional
charges against the defendants were sought by the government under
the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). The RICO
charges were dismissed by the district court because the provisions of
the Colorado statute, which served as a predicate for establishing RICO
charges, were held void for vagueness, both facially and as applied in the
case at bar.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the finding that the Colorado penal
statue at issue did define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness.
The statute also provided for adequate enforcement standards and did
not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Furthermore,
the facial challenge as to the constitutionality of the statute is inappropriate since (1) the statute itself did not threaten to chill constitutionally
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protected conduct, and (2) the challenge did not take place in a
declatory judgment action where no one had yet been charged.
United States v. Shelton, 848 F.2d 1485
Appellants Shelton and James appeal their convictions under the
mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, on the grounds the Supreme
Court's decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), invalidated their convictions. The district court refused to give McNally retroactive effect, and denied relief for the defendants. Reversed.
The defendants were once Oklahoma County commissioners, and
were convicted of mail fraud committed in the course of a kickback
scheme involving country purchases. The government never proved
this scheme deprived of money or property; rather, the only loss was the
citizens intangible right to honest government. Since the McNally decision limited applications of the mail fraud statute to deprivations of
money or property, the court of appeals found that the defendants
would not have been subject to the laws which they were convicted of
violating. Thus, the defendants were entitled to the habeas corpus relief
they sought.
United States v. Maranzino, 860 F.2d 981
Defendant appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss an indictment against him. Affirmed.
Defendant was indicted in 1985 for three counts of making materially false statements to federally insured banks. Count III of that indictment charged the defendant with falsely representing his existing debts
in a credit application. Count III is the only count at issue in this appeal.
The defendant was later indicted in 1987 on a count similar to Count III
of the 1985 indictment. Defendant argued that the indictment arose out
of the same transaction as Count III of the 1985 indictment which was
dismissed as part of a plea bargain.
The court found that Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) does not require the
government to charge all related offenses in the same indictment. The
district court's refusal to apply the "same transaction" test was affirmed
since this indictment did not allege a conspiracy to defraud a financial
constitution. Finally, this court determined that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request to see his
presentence report for purposes of proving his allegation that the current charges were included in his 1985 plea agreement which dismissed
similar charges in Count III.
United States v. Brandon, 847 F.2d 625
Appellant appeals his conviction by jury under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)
for knowing possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and the enhanced sentence he received under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) for a
conviction involving more than 500 grams of cocaine. Affirmed.
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Appellant first contends that the district court improperly admitted
for impeachment purposes evidence that a black bag found in his motel
room contained traces of cocaine. The panel held that the cross-examination of the appellant concerning the black bag was "reasonably suggested" by the appellant's direct examination and was therefore proper.
The panel also held that the district court properly exercised its discretion by taking steps to limit any unfair prejudice resulting from the cocaine's admission to impeach.
Appellant contends that the district court erred in failing to suppress the cocaine found under the motel room mattress. The district
court found that the search was within the permissible scope of appellant's consent, and the panel concluded that the finding was not clearly
erroneous.
The appellant next contends the evidence was insufficient to show
specifically that he possessed the cocaine seized with an intent to distribute and therefore his conviction is invalid. The panel found that a
reasonable jury could find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt based on the significant circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.
Finally, the appellant raised two constitutional challenges to the enhanced sentencing provision under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (B)(ii). The
due process challenge fails because the panel found the government met
its burden of alleging and proving the quantity of cocaine possessed by
the defendant. The panel also found, however, that all defendants sentenced under § 841(b) (1)(B) from October 27, 1986, when the enhanced sentencing provisions became effective, to November 1, 1987,
the effective day of the statute, received identical treatment under the
statute. Thus, there was no equal protection violation.
Lastly, the panel found that the appellant's sentence is not so
grossly disproportional to his crime as to violate the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

